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Mobility from the EU10 - some considerations as seen by 
these countries: Remarks to the brain drain, brain waste or 
brain gain debate
Klára Fóti
Introduction
Whereas the impact of increased intra-EU mobility in the receiving countries has been high on the agenda since 
the two significant waves of enlargements (2004 and 2007), so far less attention has been paid to the 
perspectives of the sending countries. This happened despite the fact that some concerns have been raised also 
from their part.
The concerns are related to the fact that among the emigrants, young people are overrepresented, which has 
implications both from demographic and economic perspectives. Similarly to most EU15 Member States, 
population of the sending countries is also ageing; the recent economic crisis affected their economies, with 
serious social consequences in most cases (slow growth, high unemployment, increasing poverty rates and 
inequalities).
When the impact on the sending countries is analysed, it is important to distinguish between short-, medium and 
possible long-term effects. Whereas in principle short-term effects can be deducted from current developments, 
there is more uncertainty when either the medium or the long-term perspectives are assessed.
It may, however, prove challenging even to analyse the current situation. Not only do shortcomings of basic data 
make cross-country comparison difficult, for a clearer picture counterfactual analysis would be needed. In order to 
give an objective, impartial assessment, it would be important to find the right balance between the positive and 
negative effects; for example, such important questions should be answered whether unemployment would be 
higher in the sending countries if emigration did not occur.
The available data show that whereas the education level of mobile EU citizens tends to be high, the majority are 
employed in low-skilled occupation. This may suggest that the motivation behind emigration could not only be 
earning higher income, but possibly also to escape from unemployment. Related to the gap between educational 
attainment and occupation level, it is relevant to ask whether this could be a long-lasting phenomenon or there 
are signs for improvement.
Despite the general tendency of EU10 migrants having low-skilled occupation, if certain professions are 
considered, such as health specialists (doctors), this is definitely not the case. As regards the emigration of highly 
specialised doctors and the ensuing shortages in that profession in the sending country (as demonstrated for 
example by Eurofound, 2013), even some signs of brain drain can be detected. In this case, the question is 
whether there could be a chance of their return in the future. The extent of potential return (and possible brain 
gain) depends to a large extent on economic perspectives of the sending countries. So far, return migration has 
not happened on a massive scale (Eurofound, 2012) presumably because the impact of the crisis could be felt 
strongly in most of the sending countries (Poland seems to be an exception as regards the strong effects of the 
crisis, but even here, scale of return migration is unknown due to deficiencies of the related data). Therefore, it is 
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not surprising, that currently there is hardly any evidence for brain gain. Some country variation can be observed, 
however, also in this regard. For example, in case of two small countries, Slovenia and Estonia, among the 
returnees, students constitute the largest group. If the majority of the members of this group stay in the country at 
least for some time, the countries could benefit from the knowledge the students acquired abroad. Even 
nowadays, however, an increased circularity (circular movement) can be observed in intra-EU mobility. This is 
likely to persist and expand in the future.
The study analyses mainly the sending countries’ perspectives, focusing first on demographic data compared 
with those of the main destination countries. In order to get some idea about the issue of possible brain drain, 
brain gain or brain waste, the second section outlines some key characteristics of the EU10 mobile citizens, and 
the third is concerned with their current labour market performance. Finally, the conclusions focus on possible 
future perspectives.
Demographic background – key features in the sending countries
If perspectives of the sending countries are considered, potential of future work force and sustainability of the 
welfare system (especially pensions) should be analysed – both current age composition and fertility rates are 
certainly relevant from this point of view.
As can be seen from Figure 1 below, it is precisely the sending countries, where share of the youngest age group 
(below 15 years of age) is usually the lowest. There are exceptions, however: among the sending countries these 
are Romania and Estonia (the share in both being about 16%) whereas among the traditional receiving countries 
Germany and Austria (the share being 13% and 14% respectively) as well as the new receiving countries, such 
as Italy and Spain (about 14% and 15%, respectively).
Figure 1: Share of population below 15 years of age in EU28, EU10 plus Croatia and some key 
destination countries
Source: Own calculations, based on Eurostat data
It seems obvious that part of the explanation for the divide between the Member States lies in 
presence/dominance of third country nationals in certain countries. This may explain the relatively high share in 
the former colonial powers (such as the UK, France and the Netherlands), whereas in Denmark and Sweden high 
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number of refugees could be attributed to that. Ireland is a special case: as is well known, it has the youngest 
population in the EU.
As regards the sending countries, however, even if the share of the youngest age group is higher in Slovakia or 
Romania than in some receiving countries (i.e. Germany, Italy, Austria or Spain), if the pace of current emigration 
continues, it is doubtful whether this relatively high share can be preserved.
To some extent, a similar pattern is shown when the total fertility rates are examined. As can be seen from Table 
1, in none of the EU countries did the indicator reach such a level which would make the so called simple 
reproduction possible – as is known, this is 2.10 (the indicator shows the average rate of child birth per women of 
child-bearing age, i.e. 15-49 in a country in a given year) This is true even for those two EU Member States which 
are known as having relatively high fertility rates, i.e. Ireland and France. Fertility rates in EU10 are usually lower 
than in EU27/28 average, the exceptions being Lithuania (interestingly) and Slovenia in 2012. However, in neither 
of them is higher fertility rate a long-term pattern. It is rather Estonia, which could be regarded as a real 
exception, where even longer trends (between 2005 and 2011) show a more favourable perspective. At the same 
time, in most EU15 countries, the fertility rate is higher than the EU average. The exceptions again are Germany, 
Austria, Italy and Spain. In one of the most important destination country, in the UK, however, fertility trends have 
constantly improved, from 1, 70 to 1, 92. It may well be that the recent increased inflow from the East-European 
Member States has contributed to the improvement.
As is clear from Table 1, however, there are fluctuations in many countries, and as regards demographic trends, 
straightforward conclusions could be drawn from a long-term perspective. The fluctuations during this short term 
period show that country-specific demographic features, such as age composition, are playing also an important 
role. This varies quite a large extent across the EU, which is reflected in Table 2. The data give quite a mixed 
picture even on the changes of share of prime working age groups in the total population.
As can be seen, although at EU average level, the share of all the younger age groups decreased between 2004 
and 2013 (just the eldest one, 44-49 years, it increased), this did not happen in any of the countries listed in the 
table. It is only in France where a drop was experienced in case of all the age groups (although in the eldest one 
it was minimal).  Share of the two youngest age groups, however, declined in almost all EU10 countries (with the 
exception of Lithuania, but even here its absolute number decreased during the last two years compared to the 
previous period, and its share increased only because the total population dropped even more than the number of 
people in the age group of 20-24 years).
Some countries experienced quite a large drop in share of certain age groups: for example even in Estonia, 
where both the share of the population below 15 years and the fertility rate show a favourable pattern, the decline 
in the youngest working age group (15-19 years) is very high and this is a result of a continuous decrease since 
joining the EU. This may not reflect, however, high number of Estonian workers abroad, rather the fact that large 
numbers of students studying mainly in Finland.
Among the EU10 countries, Hungary and the Czech Republic experienced a large drop in case of the age group 
of 25-29 years (regarded in many statistics as young people). The difference is, however, that whereas in the 
Czech Republic this is a result of a gradual decrease (with an annual decline of around 20 thousand or less), in 
case of Hungary a sudden, large drop of almost 70 thousand could be witnessed. Since, as mentioned, natural 
demographic trends are reflected in long-term developments; this sudden decrease could hardly be attributed to 
natural trends, rather to high emigration of the age cohort.
Klára Fóti: Mobility from the EU10 - some considerations as seen by these countries: Remarks to the brain ...
Mind the Gap, Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries 137
Table 1: Change of share of the prime working age groups in the total population of the 
respective countries between 2004 and 2013 (percentage points)
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
European Union (28 countries) -0.83 -0.49 -0.51 -0.56 -0.74 -0.12 0.39
European Union (27 countries) -0.83 -0.49 -0.51 -0.57 -0.75 -0.12 0.40
Belgium -0.17 0.12 0.07 -0.41 -1.09 -0.74 0.06
Bulgaria -2.12 -0.79 -0.84 -0.17 1.05 0.39 -0.55
Czech Republic -1.60 -0.93 -2.12 0.20 2.13 0.77 -0.47
Denmark 0.93 0.89 -0.86 -1.26 -1.22 -0.31 0.79
Germany -0.78 0.04 0.47 -0.70 -2.86 -1.09 1.40
Estonia -2.67 -0.23 0.28 -0.27 0.25 -0.35 -0.72
Ireland -1.46 -2.60 -0.89 0.44 0.44 0.37 0.38
Spain -0.92 -1.96 -2.54 -0.62 0.46 0.64 1.16
France -0.55 -0.40 -0.20 -0.89 -0.89 -0.24 -0.02
Croatia -0.46 -0.75 -0.03 0.47 -0.29 -0.84 -0.65
Italy -0.22 -0.43 -1.55 -1.72 -0.76 0.45 1.38
Latvia -3.17 -0.18 0.58 -0.39 -0.07 -0.60 -0.24
Lithuania -1.51 0.28 0.00 -1.21 -0.93 -0.84 0.43
Hungary -0.60 -0.72 -2.34 0.11 2.05 1.12 -1.50
Netherlands -0.06 0.34 -0.11 -1.70 -1.96 -0.39 0.42
Austria -0.25 0.10 0.28 -0.94 -2.20 -0.62 1.37
Poland -2.37 -1.56 0.33 1.51 1.40 -0.66 -2.04
Romania -2.32 -0.88 -1.20 -0.54 0.55 2.09 -1.29
Slovenia -1.66 -1.63 -0.83 0.39 -0.23 -0.62 -0.31
Slovakia -2.08 -1.32 -0.74 1.07 1.47 -0.30 -0.90
Sweden -0.26 1.19 0.18 -0.60 -0.96 0.58 0.57
United Kingdom -0.32 0.44 0.59 -0.57 -1.60 -0.36 0.79
Source: Own calculations, based on Eurostat data
Among the receiving countries, large drop is not observed in case of the younger age groups. There are two 
exceptions: Ireland and Spain, two EU15 countries, which are known of not only having large inflow of EU mobile 
citizens, but also large emigration of young people from there. In Ireland although the decline of the youngest age 
group reflects a continuous decrease, the large drop in the share of the next age group (20-24) is most likely to 
be attributed to the effects of the crisis: there was a continuous increase in their absolute number until 2008 (from 
336 thousand to 373 thousand), in 2009 their number declined by almost 14 thousand, and during the whole 
period the decrease amounted to 73 thousand. Apart from the effects of possible natural demographic 
developments, the large drop can certainly be traced back to high emigration of native young people due to 
deteriorating labour market conditions in the wake of the crisis. The same seems to apply to the next age group 
(25-29 years) in Spain, the drop of which was similarly high as that of the previous age group in Ireland. Although 
the number of people of the age group did fluctuate between 2004 and 2007, from 2008 on, there has been a 
clear trend of an annual decrease of more than 100 thousand. Apparently, in none of these two countries could 
the inflow of EU mobile citizens compensate for the large decrease in share of the respective age groups (all the 
less so since this inflow slowed down precisely during this period, i.e. after 2008).From the above changes, 
similar developments seemed to happen in Italy, though to a lesser extent and in case of older age groups.
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Despite these exceptions and the mixed picture, there seems to be a division between the EU15 and EU10 
countries also in recent changes of prime working age composition of the population. Even if natural demographic 
developments (natural decrease/increase related to fertility and mortality rates, average life expectancy at birth 
within the respective countries) certainly influence the age composition, it can be assumed that large decline in 
the share of the younger age groups is due to high emigration of young people from these countries. This is 
reflected in the fact that the largest drops in share of the youngest age groups are experienced precisely mainly in 
those countries, from which the emigration is particularly high: Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Poland and 
Slovakia. For example in case of Latvia (where the drop of the share of the youngest age group is the highest 
being 3,17 percentage points), between the two last censuses (2000 and 2011) the country’s population 
decreased by 13%, and out of this, 63% “was due to negative net migration over the last decade” (Eurofound, 
2014, p. 26) Similarly, outflow from Lithuania was also high, experiencing negative net migration of more than 38 
thousand and 21 thousand in 2011 and 2012, respectively (Statistics Lithuania, quoted in Eurofound, 2014.) – in 
country with a population of about 3 million people, this can be regarded as a considerable loss. Although in 
Bulgaria, a much lower share of the loss of its population was attributed to emigration than in Latvia, the loss itself 
between the two censuses (i.e. during the first decade of 2000s) was very large, being 564 thousand – out of this 
about one third is estimated to be due to emigration, whereas the rest, two thirds is attributed to natural decrease 
(ibid, p. 27). The latter is, however, obviously related to previous large emigration waves which accelerated aging 
of the population in the country. Undoubtedly, however, the two largest sending countries are Romania and 
Poland. According to the latest estimates, about 2,1 million Romanians work in other EU countries in 2013, 
whereas the number of Polish citizens staying abroad was about 2,06 million in 2011 (ibid, source for Polish data: 
OECD 2013).
Some key characteristics of the EU10 mobile citizens
Various findings from research on the main characteristics of EU10 mobile citizens in the destination countries 
confirm what table 3 suggests from the sending countries’ perspectives, namely that those EU mobile citizens 
tend to be young and there is evidence for the strong presence (dominance) of the prime working age population.   
This is a common feature characterising the EU10 mobile citizens across all destination countries compared not 
only with natives, but also other migrant groups. In the UK for example, a research project, covering new arrivals 
during quite a long period (2000-2012), concluded that the average age of the EU10 mobile citizens stood at 30.4 
years, whereas for the natives, this was much higher, being 40.8 and in case of the other EEA (European 
Economic Area164) countries the difference was not as high but their average age was still higher: 31 years. As 
regards the non-EEA arrivals, their average age stood at 32,2 years (Frattini, 2014). Supposedly, even this 
finding underestimates the average age of more recent arrivals from EU10 (i.e. after the accession, 2004 and 
2007), as evidenced by other research covering the period since the accession only and/or showing more recent 
data. They pointed to average even below 30 years.165
Research covering the period of the first decade of the new Millennium revealed that the EU10 mobile citizens 
were well-educated and had no family (as yet). It was found that in fact, education level of the EU10 mobile 
164 They include the EU28 plus Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway.
165 Even the same research showed that, when later arrivals (2008-09) were examined, their average age stood at lower level, being 29,5. 
Although due to data problems, different immigrant groups could not be distinguished among them, it can be assumed that since EU10 
migrants dominated the group of immigrants arriving to the UKat that time, this figure reflects their younger age. In addition, preliminary 
finding of a more recent research covering the latest data (also from 2013) also found an average of the EU10 citizens below 30 years 
(Eurofound, 2015, forthcoming).
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citizens is higher than that of the host population in EU15: the share of EU10 migrants with high educational 
attainment stood at 26.9% in 2009 (whereas the respective share within the total EU10 population was 15.5% 
only, and the corresponding figure for the total EU15 population was also lower, 21.7% - Kahanec, 2012, p. 29). 
Despite this, however, the EU12 migrants work in less-skilled occupations than natives. (2010 Labour Force 
Survey-data, Kahanec, ibid, p. 22.)
Preliminary findings of a more recent research (Eurofound 2015, forthcoming) revealed that EU10 mobile citizens 
increasingly had families, though this change is very gradual. This is the case for example, in one of the host 
countries, in Denmark. Similarly, research in the UK found that among the various welfare benefits, EU10 citizens 
are mostly recipients of family related and child benefits. At the same time, in many destination countries related 
to younger age of EU10 mobile citizens, their share of unmarried persons is still higher than that of natives, 
although this is not everywhere the case.
When gender composition is examined, various research findings showed a balanced gender pattern, although 
the most recent research by Eurofound pointed out  in case of some nationalities and in some host countries, 
women’s share is higher (e.g. in Austria, that of Bulgarian and Romanian women), and they tend not to have
families as yet.
Although more recent research confirmed previous findings of higher educational attainment of EU10 mobile 
citizens than natives, it also showed that for example in the UK, their qualification level is lower than that of the 
other immigrant groups: share of highly educated EU10 citizens was 37% (vis-à-vis 16% for natives), but this 
proportion stood at 49% for other EEA citizens and in the case of the non-EEA citizens it was higher, being 42% 
(Frattini 2014). Recent research by Eurofound (2015 – forthcoming) shows that educational attainment of the 
EU10 citizens seems to vary both by the destination countries and countries of origin.
As regards the occupational pattern, a more straightforward picture is shown: most EU10 citizens are occupied in 
low-skilled jobs: they “were far more likely to perform unskilled work {than other immigrant groups and natives –
KF}: a full half of the 2009 cohort who were employed a year after arrival were in the lowest-skilled jobs…” 
Bevelander et al. 2014). The study continued to conclude that EU10-origin “workers who entered after EU 
enlargement were more likely to be employed in elementary occupations than their compatriots who emigrated 
earlier, because these later cohorts were not subject to selection criteria.166 But over time, immigrants did appear 
able to move out of the lowest-skilled work. Those who arrived in 2001 saw their employment in the lowest-skilled 
jobs fall by almost 10% after a decade, although the share remained around 5 percent higher than natives. Post-
enlargement cohorts also saw improvement over time, although from a much higher base.”(Emphases – italics –
are mines, KF – Bevelander et al., 2014)
In some countries agriculture as a recipient sector seems important, in others it is rather construction and 
services (such as tourism, catering, domestic help and cleaning) which are dominant. (Eurofound, 2014)
166 This is certainly true from the demand side. But as regards labour supply (i.e. from the perspective of the EU10 citizens), as mentioned, 
one of their motivations for emigration to achieve higher income, which could be (even much) higher than if they were employed in a 
higher-skilled job in their home country. Many of them want to accumulate sufficient financial resources to start a business or 
buy/build/refurbish a property in their home countries when they return, or they hope to be able to get a better job over time in the host
country, if they want to stay.
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Current trends in labour market performance of recent EU immigrants
It is well known that main motivation of EU10 mobile citizens behind their emigration is to achieve higher income 
level, therefore their main objective is to work in the destination country selected (apart from their age pattern 
mentioned above, this is reflected by their high participation rate in all destination countries, confirmed by 
evidence). After the crisis, however, due to their vulnerable labour market position (low-skilled jobs, high 
concentration in sectors which were particularly hard hit by the economic downturn, such as construction and 
manufacturing), many of them lost their jobs and it was either difficult to find a new permanent one, or others had 
to take up more than one part-time jobs in order to make ends meet. Within this context, trends in their 
employment rates vis-à-vis the natives are worthwhile to examine.
As can be seen from Table 3, at EU level (EU27/28), the average employment rate of the EU12 mobile citizens167
was always the highest compared to the total and that of the natives. The effect of the crisis is very clear: 
employment rates of all the three groups (total, natives, and EU12 mobile citizens) started to fall in 2009. 
Whereas the decline, however, seems to have stopped in 2011 for the former two groups, this did not happen for 
the EU12 mobile workers. Moreover, as a consequence of the crisis, the employment rate of the EU12 mobile 
citizens decreased more dramatically than that of the other two groups, so the gap between that of the first group 
on the one hand and employment rates of the latter two groups narrowed down: whereas the employment rate of 
the EU12 mobile citizens was close to 7 percentage points higher than that of the total or the natives in 2007, the 
difference halved, having dropped to a bit more than 3 percentage points.
If the individual countries are considered, it is remarkable that despite the (seemingly still) favourable (although 
deteriorating) situation at EU level, the data reflect vulnerable labour market position of the EU12 mobile citizens 
in many of the individual destination countries. Even during the pre-crisis period (i.e. in 2007), in 6 out of the 10 
key host countries examined (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands), employment 
rate of the EU12 mobile citizens was lower than that of the natives. Although, not surprisingly, this situation has 
not changed since then in most destination countries, Belgium is the only exception where this turned reversed.   
However, in Spain, which is among the countries suffered most from the crisis and its labour market deteriorated 
to a considerable extent, employment rate of EU12 mobile citizens worsened even more, by their rate having 
dropped to a level below that of the natives by 2010 and a further deterioration occurred in 2011. It is interesting 
to see, however, that in Italy, where employment rate of natives is the lowest among all the countries examined in 
Table 3, this has not happened. Previous research results confirmed that in Italy the EU10 citizens did not suffer 
from such a huge job loss than in Spain, where the flourishing construction industry (due to previous property 
market bubble) all of a sudden collapsed. – This did not happen in Italy (or at least not to such an extent), instead, 
there was a higher demand there for those skills the new EU migrants could offer). Even if in some crisis-stricken 
countries (besides Italy also in Ireland) the employment rate of the EU10 mobile citizens remained higher, the 
difference diminished: this is most notable in the case of Ireland, where it declined from more than 15 percentage 
points to less than 7 percentage points.
Trends in employment rates obviously reflect the labour market and economic situation within a certain country. 
For example in Germany, which was not affected by the crisis seriously, the employment rate of the EU10 mobile 
workers increased and the difference diminished to some extent.
167 Eurostat data contain not only the EU10 citizens but include those from Malta and Cyprus respectively, the two countries which joined 
the EU at the same time when EU8 did, i.e. in 2004.
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Table 2: Total employment rates, those of natives (N) and EU12 mobile citizens in the EU and 
selected key destination countries (%)
2007 20008 2009 2010 2011
Total N EU12 Total N EU12 Total N EU12 Total N EU12 Total N EU12
EU28 65.3 65.5 72.1 65.7 65.9 71.1 64.5 64.8 68.5 64.0 64.4 68.1 64.1 64.5 67.6
EU27 65.3 65.5 72.1 65.8 66.0 71.1 64.5 64.9 68.5 64.1 64.5 68.1 64.2 64.6 67.6
EU15 66.8 67.3 72.0 67.1 67.5 71.0 65.8 66.3 68.3 65.4 66.0 67.9 65.5 66.1 67.5
BE 62.0 62.9 61.9 62.4 63.1 60.9 61.6 62.5 63.1 62.0 62.8 66.2 61.9 63.0 66.1
DK 77.0 78.1 72.2 77.9 78.7 77.5 75.3 76.0 78.8 73.3 74.1 71.3 73.1 74.1 66.9
DE 69.0 70.5 61.8 70.1 71.7 64.0 70.3 71.9 65.9 71.1 72.7 65.1 72.5 74.0 68.4
IE 69.2 68.3 83.9 67.6 66.9 79.3 61.9 61.7 67.4 59.6 59.6 63.8 58.9 58.7 65.0
ES 65.6 65.1 72.7 64.3 64.2 68.1 59.8 60.3 61.3 58.6 59.0 58.8 57.7 58.4 54.8
IT 58.7 58.1 71.7 58.7 58.1 70.1 57.5 56.9 69.5 56.9 56.3 69.2 56.9 56.4 66.9
NL 76.0 76.7 67.3 77.2 77.8 76.2 77.0 77.6 66.1 74.7 75.3 68.0 74.9 75.6 72.0
AT 71.4 72.4 70.0 72.1 73.2 67.4 71.6 72.8 63.5 71.7 72.8 64.9 72.1 73.2 66.9
SE 74.2 75.0 60.8 74.3 75.1 68.4 72.2 73.0 67.3 72.1 73.1 65.2 73.6 74.8 65.0
UK 71.5 71.9 80.9 71.5 71.8 81.7 69.9 70.2 81.0 69.5 69.8 80.6 69.5 69.7 80.3
Source: Own calculations, based on Eurostat data.
Of course, the average employment rate masks the differences of that of various nationalities. In Sweden labour 
market outcomes of earlier arrivals (in 1993-97) were examined. It was found that by 2011, employment rate of 
Polish citizens has reached almost the same level, as that of citizens from the other Scandinavian countries 
(Denmark, Finland and Norway). It’s interesting to see that even the trend was similar, especially between 2002 
and 2011 (in 1997 the Poles’ employment rate was much lower, being just above 20%, although even then this 
was higher than those of other immigrants (e.g. Bosnia, rest of former Yugoslavia, Turkey, Iraq and Iran, but 
whereas immigrants from the former two managed to exceed the native employment rate of 81% by 2011, other 
citizens from third countries could not catch up - Bevelander et al., 2014, p. 12)
Conclusions: possible future perspectives
Considering the current situation, it is difficult to give a clear answer to the question formulated in the title. The 
reason is that ongoing developments do not reflect in a straightforward way whether there is a brain drain, brain 
gain or brain waste. According to the available data, the majority of East-European mobile citizens are 
overqualified for the job they have in the host countries.  Therefore at present signs of brain waste seem to 
prevail. A well-known Polish migration expert, Pawel Kaczmarczyk, asks whether brain waste is something which 
cannot be avoided.168
168 This was asked also in his presentation, entitled ‘Well-educated migrants on the European labour market: between brain gain and brain 
waste’, which was held in Brussels, September 2014.
From his research, he concluded that return to human capital is generally low for EU8 
citizens, especially for Poles, where it is very low (his research pointed out a wage penalty in their case). As 
assumed reasons, he identified the shortcomings of skill transferability, lack of language knowledge and possible 
cohort effects Kaczmarczyk (2014). He quotes some researchers (Mattoo et al.), who conclude that there is a 
“common brain waste”, which is likely to persist because as a consequence of the aforementioned low return, 
Klára Fóti: Mobility from the EU10 - some considerations as seen by these countries: Remarks to the brain ...
142 Mind the Gap, Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries
there are “low incentives to invest in human capital”. The fact that “many migrants do not get a good return on 
their education in the local labor market” is confirmed also by Benton et al., 2014.
Previous research on long-term labour market perspectives of immigrants has, however, provided evidence of 
many foreign workers being able to “climb up the occupational ladder” over time (see for example: Bevelander et 
al, 2014). There are even some signs of this happening also in the case of the EU10 mobile citizens. According to 
these experiences, migrants could have strong incentive to invest in host country-specific human capital, such as 
learning the language and attending such training courses which enable them to get the jobs they aspire for.
As regards brain drain, its definition, as provided by Kaczmarczyk (2014), is a “selective outflow of highly skilled 
persons”. Within the context of post-enlargement migration of the EU10 citizens, he and Okolski (Kaczmarczyk 
and Okolski, 2008) introduced the term “brain overflow” – (as an alternative to brain drain). Indeed, if the gap 
between educational attainment of EU10 citizens and their labour market outcomes (in terms of not only their 
employment level but their occupation as well) is considered, this seems to be a more appropriate term for 
describing the current situation than that of the brain drain. The phenomenon of “brain overflow”, however, could 
provide a good base for their better labour market performance.
The aforementioned Polish experts seem quite pessimistic when they attempt to draw a balance between the 
costs and benefits of mobility. They say169 that “while countries of destination, on average, benefit from 
immigration, countries of origin tend to bear relatively high costs of the outflow”. Indeed, it seems that the intra-EU 
mobility has substantial social consequences on the sending countries, which are apparent not only in changes of 
demographic pattern in these countries (e.g. age composition of the population), but also in lives of individual 
families. This could have far-reaching consequences also for some social services in the future in these countries 
as well.170
169 See Kaczmarczyk’s presentation, mentioned before
170 Let alone those long-term psycho-social consequences the children who are left behind, would suffer from the absence of their parents. 
This should be considered when possible perspectives are assessed, even if there is no hard evidence on this as yet, and detailed 
analysis of the topic is beyond the scope of this study.
For example, impacts on family members left behind, or the effects of outflow on regions/small 
areas/villages, impacts are already significant. This situation may result in an expansion of long-term care 
services in the future, not only due to demographic changes but also due to more (payable) demand for these 
from the part of EU mobile citizens (in the form of remittances to their family members left behind).
Even nowadays, however, an increased circularity (circular movement) can be observed in intra-EU mobility. This 
is likely to persist and expand in the future. If, as part of circularity, return migration will occur on a larger scale 
than today, the issue of brain drain and brain gain may not be as high on the agenda as today.
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Appendix
Table A1: Total fertility rates in EU27/28, EU10 plus Croatia and in some key destination 
countries
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
European Union (28 countries) 1.47 1.50 1.51 1.54 1.56* 1.61 1.60 1.61 1.58* 1.58*
European Union (27 countries) 1.47 1.50 1.51 1.54 1.56* 1.61 1.60 1.61 1.58* 1.58*
Belgium 1.67 1.72 1.76 1.80 1.82 1.85 1.84 1.86 1.81* 1.79
Bulgaria 1.23 1.29 1.32 1.38 1.49* 1.56 1.66 1.57 1.51 1.50
Czech Republic 1.18 1.23 1.29 1.34 1.45 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.43 1.45
Denmark 1.76 1.78 1.80 1.85 1.84 1.89 1.84 1.87 1.75 1.73
Germany 1.34 1.36 1.34 1.33 1.37 1.38 1.36 1.39 1.36 1.38
Estonia 1.37 1.47 1.52 1.58 1.69 1.72 1.70 1.72 1.61 1.56
Ireland 1.96 1.93 1.86 1.91 2.01 2.06 2.06 2.05 2.03 2.01
Spain 1.30 1.31 1.33 1.36 1.38 1.45 1.38 1.37 1.34 1.32
France 1.89 1.92 1.94 2.00 1.98 2.01 2.00 2.03 2.01 2.01
Croatia 1.41 1.43 1.50 1.47 1.48 1.55 1.58 1.55 1.48 1.51
Italy 1.29 1.34 1.34 1.37 1.40 1.45 1.45 1.46 1.44 1.43
Latvia 1.32 1.29 1.39 1.46 1.54 1.58 1.46 1.36 1.33 1.44
Lithuania 1.26 1.27 1.29 1.33 1.36 1.45 1.50 1.50 1.55 1.60
Hungary 1.27 1.28 1.31 1.34 1.32 1.35 1.32 1.25 1.26 1.34
Netherlands 1.75 1.72 1.71 1.72 1.72 1.77 1.79 1.79 1.76 1.72
Austria 1.38 1.42 1.41 1.41 1.38 1.42 1.39 1.44 1.43 1.44
Poland 1.22 1.23 1.24 1.27 1.31 1.39 1.40 1.38 1.30* 1.30
Romania 1.31 1.35 1.39 1.40 1.42 1.53 1.57 1.54 1.46 1.53
Slovenia 1.20 1.25 1.26 1.31 1.38 1.53 1.53 1.57 1.56 1.58
Slovakia 1.20 1.25 1.27 1.25 1.27 1.34 1.44 1.43 1.45 1.34
Sweden 1.71 1.75 1.77 1.85 1.88 1.91 1.94 1.98 1.90 1.91
United Kingdom 1.70 1.75 1.76 1.82 1.86 1.91 1.89 1.92 1.91 1.92
Note: *Break in series
Source: Eurostat
